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Introduction
Two competing hypotheses describe how globalisation influences the welfare state: the raceto-the-bottom hypothesis predicts declining welfare states in the course of globalisation and the compensation hypothesis rather predicts strong welfare states which protect citizens against the risks of globalisation. Welfare states have not yet disappeared, and many studies indeed corroborated the compensation hypothesis proposed by Cameron (1978) and Rodrik (1998) .
The evidence in favour of the compensation hypothesis is based on data for industrialised countries (OECD). Scholars have mostly focused on industrialised countries because industrialised countries have encompassing social policy programs (e.g., social security, public health services, unemployment benefits and active labour market policies etc.). Moreover, data on social expenditure has traditionally been available only for industrialised countries. There is thus a clear need for research investigating the globalisation-welfare state nexus in developing countries.
Asian countries are especially interesting to examine because citizens in Asian countries tend to enjoy family or other in-group assistance and can therefore be expected to be less inclined to demand public social expenditure than citizens in OECD countries. The new study by Lim and Burgoon (2018) examines the globalisation-welfare state nexus in Asia by using micro-data but evidence at the macro-level is lacking. In 2017, the OECD has published new data on social expenditure for selected Asian non-OECD countries that I use to examine the effects of globalisation on social expenditure at the macro-level. Using this new data, I
investigate whether the compensation hypothesis generalises to other middle-and lowerincome countries. Compensation is likely to be less pronounced in middle-and lower-income countries than in high-income countries because compensation requires that governments have financial opportunities to increase social expenditure and institutions, such as strong trade unions, which are able to demand an increase in social expenditure.
The OECD compiled social protection expenditure for 21 Asian non-OECD countries that I use. Globalisation is measured by the new KOF Globalisation Index (Dreher 2006 , Dreher et al. 2008a , Gygli et al. 2018 . 2 The results do not suggest that globalisation influenced social expenditure in Asia. The results do also not suggest that the nexus between globalisation and social expenditure varied between high-income countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore compared to other lower-income Asian countries.
2. The globalisation-welfare state nexus: previous studies
Theories
The race-to-the-bottom hypothesis holds that globalisation puts pressure on national governments to reduce the size and scope of government. In the course of increasing competition among countries, national governments may well decrease tax rates, especially corporate tax rates and tax rates on interest incomes in order to attract foreign investors (e.g., Sinn 1997 and 2003) . Locations of corporations and investments in financial assets are mobile in a globalised world, and national governments have understood to not tax mobile factors.
Trade regulations and tariffs declined, capital account restrictions were abolished, information spreads rapidly via the internet, national governments collaborate in international organizations, and countries have become more similar (westernisation). Globalisation indeed increased competition between national governments. The more competition between national governments there is, the more tax rates are expected to decrease. Corporate tax rates and tax rates on interest income might converge to zero. Some commentators conjecture that small tax rates on interest income and small corporate tax rates give rise to drastically declining tax revenues. When tax revenues decline drastically, government expenditure, in turn, needs to also 2 Scholars now use the new KOF index to re-examine effects of globalisation that have been examined based on previous versions of the KOF index. An example is the effect of globalisation on tax rates (Gozgor and Ranjan 2018).
decrease. In particular, market-oriented governments, which have been active in lowering business taxation, will cut social expenditure. Advocates of the dark side of globalisation fear that (western) welfare states erode in the course of globalisation.
The compensation hypothesis portrays a more optimistic view of globalisation (Cameron 1978 , Rodrik 1998 . Because of increasing uncertainty in the course of globalisation, national governments may want to protect citizens against the risks of globalisation and increase size and scope of government. In particular, social expenditure is likely to be increased to compensate for uncertainty and risks. Important examples include generous unemployment health insurance that may well help those citizens who do not enjoy other benefits of globalisation.
Industrialised countries
The empirical evidence on how globalisation influences tax rates and public (social) spending tends to support the compensation hypothesis rather than the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis (Cameron 1978 , Dreher et al. 2008b , Potrafke 2009 , Walter 2010 , Meinhard and Potrafke 2012 , Gaston and Rajaguru 2013a and 2013b , Herwartz and Theilen 2014 , Gozgor and Ranjan 2017 , Yay and Aksoy 2018 , Gründler and Köllner 2018 for surveys see Schulze and Ursprung 1999 , Ursprung 2008 , Potrafke 2015 . Social expenditure has, for example, drastically increased in OECD countries and dominates fiscal policies -proceeding globalisation notwithstanding.
Social expenditure tends to undermine economic growth and fiscal sustainability. Schuknecht and Zemanek (2018) describe the trend of increasing social expenditure and its consequences as "social dominance". There is, however, some heterogeneity across OECD countries regarding globalisation-induced effects. Social expenditure tended to increase in high-income (West) European countries and to decrease in low-income (East) countries when globalisation was proceeding rapidly (Leibrecht et al. 2011 , Onaran et al. 2012 and 2014 . The globalisationinduced effects also differed across welfare state regimes supporting the compensation effect in social democrat, conservative and Mediterranean welfare state regimes and the efficiency effect in liberal welfare state regimes (Yay and Aksoy 2018) .
Asian developing countries
Globalisation is expected to put more pressure on welfare states in developing than developed countries (Rudra 2002 , Wibbels 2006 Governments in developing countries have more difficulties to borrow on capital markets (to countercyclically spend on social affairs) than governments in industrialised countries (Wibbels 2006) . Fiscal policies in Latin American countries, for example, have been described to be rather pro-cyclical.
There is hardly any empirical evidence on the globalisation-welfare state nexus in developing countries -the most important reason being a lack of data for policy measures. In particular, social expenditure has been difficult to measure in developing countries, because social protection programs are quite encompassing and vary across countries. Micro-data evidence suggests that citizens' views on whether governments should provide welfare spending in the course of globalisation depends on income (Lim and Burgoon 2018). In high-income Asian countries such as Japan and Singapore, citizens exposed to economic globalisation were more likely to support welfare spending than citizens who were less exposed to globalisation. In low-income countries, by contrast, being exposed to globalisation did not predict support for welfare spending (Lim and Burgoon 2018). In a similar vein, the effect of being exposed to globalisation was pronounced in countries which do not have generous private severance pay systems. Being exposed to globalisation did not influence welfare spending preferences of those citizens who enjoy family or other private social assistance. The effect of globalisation on social expenditure is therefore also likely to differ across Asian countries, especially being conditioned on a country's income. Social expenditure increased in 18 out of the 21 countries from 2000 to 2014 and decreased in three countries: Azerbaijan (8.6% to 7.6%), Lao PDR (1.7% to 1.0%), Sri Lanka (4.4% to 3.8%).
The 21 countries in my sample are quite heterogenous (e.g., Tohyama 2015).
Heterogeneity relates to income per capita (Singapore, for example, is the by far most developed country in the sample) and also to social protection. The OECD (2017: 48) concludes: "Overall, it seems that in South Asia and the Pacific social protection systems are still at a relatively early stage of development in contrast to Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Mongolia, Thailand and the OECD countries in the region". Heterogeneity across countries also means that the SOCX data do not include expenditure for every individual social policy type in every country. In countries such as Bangladesh, there is no statutory program on invalidity, survivors or family allowances.
The SOCX data is, however, the best attempt to measure social expenditure and the OECD (2017) describes in detail number and type of social policy areas covered.
China is also an interesting case to discuss. In particular, income inequality has been a major issue in China and globalisation has been shown to increase income inequality in China . Social expenditure increased, however, from 4.7% in 2000, to 6.98% in 2009 and 8.0% in 2014. The OECD (2017: 44) reports: "some countries have tried to extend coverage of social insurance programs, and such efforts were arguably most successful in China".
New KOF Globalisation Index
The KOF Globalisation Index has been introduced by Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008a) and was now revised by Gygli et al. (2018) . The KOF Globalisation Index considers that globalisation is a multifaceted concept and combines economic, social, and political aspects of 
Empirical model
The baseline panel data model has the following form:
Social Expenditureit = α Globalisationit + Σk γk Xikt + ηi + εt + uit with i=1,…,21; k=1,…,3; t=1,...,3
where the dependent variable Social Expenditureit describes public social expenditure (in % of GDP) in country i and year t (2000, 2009, and 2014) . Globalisationit is the KOF Globalisation Index. In section 5.2, I replace the overall KOF Globalisation Index by the three subindices (economic, social, political). Σk Xikt contains three control variables. I include the unemployment rate and expect it to be positively correlated with social expenditure:
governments are likely to increase public social expenditure when the unemployment rate is high. The shares of the population aged below 15 and above 64 (as a share of total population) are included to control for the effect of demographic change on social expenditure. The higher the share of the non-working age population, especially old-age population, the higher social expenditure is expected to be. I keep the number of explanatory variables to be quite small because the sample includes 61 country-year observations. For robustness checks, I also include GDP per capita (in levels and growth) and measure young and old population by the share of population aged between 15 and 64. Inferences regarding the globalisation variables do not change. I return to including government ideology and economic freedom in the robustness tests section because government ideology and economic freedom are not available for my full sample. Table 2 shows the results of the baseline model. The estimated coefficient of the overall globalisation index is positive in columns (1) to (4). The coefficient estimate is statistically significant when no fixed period effects (column 1) are included. The coefficient of the KOF Globalisation Index lacks statistical significance in columns (2) to (4).
Results

Baseline model
The fixed period effects are positive and statistically significant in columns (2) and (3) indicating that social expenditure (in % of GDP) was by about 1.4 percentage points higher in the year 2009 and by about 1.7 percentage points higher in the year 2014 than in the year 2000.
The estimates of the fixed period effects are much smaller and lack statistical significance when the shares of the population aged below 15 and above 65 are included. This result reflects the demographic change, hence correlation between the fixed period effects and the increasing share of old age population and decreasing share of young population. The coefficient estimate of the unemployment rate has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 10% level in columns (3) and (4). The coefficient estimates of the shares of the population aged below 15 and above 65 do not turn out to be statistically significant. Table 2 . The exclusion restriction is, however, rather unlikely to be fulfilled. On instrumenting the KOF index see, for example, Eppinger and Potrafke (2016).
Sub indices
I estimate the four specifications of the baseline model shown and Table 2 and replace the overall KOF Globalisation Index by subindices on economic, social and political globalisation.
The results show that the conditional correlations between the three KOF subindices and public social expenditure do not turn out to be statistically significant (Table 3) . I have also used the more fine-grained subindices that distinguish between de facto and de jure globalisation and the detailed subindices on economic globalisation (trade and financial). The results do also not suggest that these subindices were correlated with social expenditure (not shown).
Time-invariant explanatory variables
The Asian countries in my sample are quite heterogenous, and the amount of social expenditure and the effect of globalisation on social expenditure is likely to differ across the countries have also included interaction terms between the regional dummy variables and the KOF Globalisation Index and computed marginal effects (coefficient estimates shown in Table 4 ).
The results do also not suggest that the effect of globalisation on social expenditure differed across regions. between the income group variables and the KOF Globalisation Index (Table 5 ). The results do not suggest that both the amount of social expenditure and the effect of globalisation on social expenditure differed across income groups.
Other robustness tests
The partisan theories suggest that leftwing governments spend more on social welfare than does not turn out to be statistically significant. Including it does not change the inferences regarding the globalisation variables.
Democracies are likely to have higher social expenditure than dictatorships. I use the new data on political institutions by Bjørnskov and Rode (2018) that updates the data by Cheibub et al. (2010) . Countries are coded as democratic when elections are contested. The democracy dummy variable assumes the value one for democracies and zero for dictatorships.
The data is available for my full sample and suggests that some countries have changed political 
Conclusion
Reliable data on public social expenditure used to be available only for industrialised countries.
Scholars have employed this data to examine the globalisation-welfare state nexus and reported that the effect of globalisation on social expenditure is not negative as advocates of the dark side of globalisation maintain: we certainly did not observe a race-to-the-bottom in social service provision. By contrast, there has been evidence in favour of the compensation hypothesis which predicts that governments increase social expenditure when globalisation is proceeding rapidly. It is correct, however, that this evidence for industrialised countries does not help to estimate effects of globalisation on social expenditure in low-income countries. The available evidence on globalisation-induced social spending patterns in low-income countries is so meagre because of a lack of data.
I have used new macro data on social expenditure in 21 Asian non-OECD countries.
The results do not suggest that globalisation had any influence on social expenditure. It is conceivable that we do not observe evidence in favour of the compensation hypothesis because Asian low-income countries have fewer financial opportunities and weaker labour market institutions that help to increase social expenditure. Societal structures in low-income countries put more emphasis on family ties and other private assistance networks than in OECD countries.
My result is in line with new evidence based on Asian micro-data by Lim and Burgoon (2018) suggesting that citizens in low-income countries do not advocate more welfare spending in the course of globalisation -the level of being exposed to globalisation notwithstanding. The micro evidence by Lim and Burgoon (2018) moreover suggests that, in high-income Asian countries, citizens who are exposed to globalisation advocate more welfare spending than citizens who are less exposed. My macro-data sample only includes the high-income countries expenditure. An example is tinkering with labour market institutions, for example by increasing minimum wages. Globalisation as measured by the KOF Globalisation Index has however not been shown to influence labour market institutions in OECD countries and in larger samples of countries (Potrafke 2010 and 2013) . More fine-grained data may help to disentangle effects of globalisation on labour market institutions in Asia.
in Asia. Globalisation has been shown to increase income inequality in various samples of countries (Dreher and Gaston 2018 , Bergh and Nilsson 2010 , Gozgor and Ranjan 2017 , Dorn and Schinke 2018 , Lang and Tavares 2018 . An important question is whether the social protection programs in Asia helped to mitigate globalisation-induced income inequality. 
